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Note
Liability Coverage for "Damages Because of Property
Damage" Under the Comprehensive General
Liability Policy
INTRODUCTION
Liability insurance,' a recently developed risk-spreading
mechanism, 2 plays a vital role in modern economics and soci-
ety. Most commercial ventures could not survive in the fast-
paced market system without the protection of liability insur-
ance, which transfers defined liability risks from insured busi-
nesses to professional risk bearers. 3 With the risks transferred,
ventures need not retain funds to self-insure against potential
liability. As a result, commodity prices decrease in proportion
to the lower cost of protection, 4 and psychological inhibitions to
expansion and innovation caused by gambling on the chance of
liability are reduced.5 Furthermore, the public not only bene-
1. A liability insurer promises to pay on behalf of the insured all sums
that the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages arising out of the risks
named in the policy. Unlike indemnity insurance, under which the insured
must suffer an actual loss before the insurer is liable, the obligation of a liabil-
ity insurer accrues as soon as the insured's liability attaches. See, e.g., Ahmed
v. American S.S. Owners Mut. Protection & Indem. Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 569, 571
(N.D. Cal. 1978), affid in part, remanded in part, 640 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1981)
(contrasting liability and indemnity policies); White v. Goodville Mut. Casualty
Co., 226 Kan. 191, 194-95, 596 P.2d 1229, 1231-32 (1979) (same).
2. The origins of liability insurance can be traced to a policy issued in
1886 to an employer, protecting against responsibility to employees for dam-
ages. See Caverly, The Background of the Casualty and Bonding Business in
the United States, [6] INS. CouNs. J., Oct. 1939, at 62, 63. In contrast, marine in-
surance, the earliest form of insurance as it is known today, can be traced to
the fourteenth century. See Caffrey, Background and Developments in Casu-
alty Insurance, 34 INs. CouNs. J. 145, 145 (1967).
3. The risk bearer, an insurance company, in turn transfers the cost of
bearing the risk to a pool of similarly situated ventures in the form of premi-
ums. J. LONG & D. GREGG, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE HANDBOOK 30
(1965).
4. S. HUEBNER, K BLACK JR. & R. CLINE, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE 7 (3d ed. 1982) (only the relatively small premium must be passed on to
consumer as cost of doing business, rather than sums sufficient to cover entire
loss).
5. Id. (insurance increases marketplace efficiency of ventures by relieving
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fits from an active economy, but also is assured the continued
protection of a products liability law made viable by the availa-
bility of funds to pay judgments.6
The efficacy of liability insurance is purely illusory, how-
ever, when policies do not adequately delineate the liability
risks transferred. Complicated and ambiguous language leaves
insureds unable to predict the scope of purchased liability pro-
tection; uncertainty minimizes the benefits of insurance. In-
stead of gambling on possible liability, ventures gamble on
policies' coverage. Funds must be retained to self-insure, com-
modity prices increase correspondingly, and change and expan-
them of anxiety resulting from possibility of losses); J. LONG & D. GREGG, supra
note 3, at 6. One commentator asserts that the absence of liability insurance
would do more than merely inhibit marketing practices-it would destroy the
capitalistic state:
[I]n the modern capitalistic state there is, too, the single naturally pre-
cious commodity that is just as vital to the very existence of the state-
private liability insurance. Cease that institution and every industrial
wheel, from the watchmaker's tiny mainspring to the turbines of the
power plant, will cease its revolutions. No manufacturer, railroader,
fabricator, druggist or industrialist will continue to risk his fortune.
Belli, The Social Value of Liability Insurance, 13 HASTINGS U.J. 169, 172 (1961).
Although such a forecast may be overstating the case, liability insurance
may be essential to the survival of some industries. For example, it is doubtful
that many ventures would find it economically feasible to expand into hazard-
ous but useful fields if they were unable to transfer the risk of potentially cata-
strophic losses. See, e.g., S. HUEBNER, K. BLAcK JR. & R. CLINE, supra note 4, at
8 (development of nuclear power largely dependent on availability of insurance
protection).
6. Products liability law gains both justification and vitality from the
availability of liability insurance. The ability of manufacturers, distributors,
and vendors to make an equitable distribution of the risks of loss underlies
much of the expansion of products liability law in recent decades. See, e.g.,
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379-80, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960)
(court's abolition of privity requirement in implied warranty actions justified in
part by manufacturers' and distributors' better ability to spread losses). The
role of liability insurance in this risk-spreading ability was outlined in the pro-
phetic concurrence of Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court in Es-
cola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944):
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to
meet its consequences. The cost of an injury or the loss of time or
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and
a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufac-
turer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business....
However intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphaz-
ardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk
and a general one. Against such a risk there should be general and
constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford
such protection.
With an estimated sixty to seventy thousand products liability claims filed
against liability insurance policies in 1976 alone, see Schwartz, Administration
Initiatives to Address the Product Liability Remedies that Meet the Problem's
Causes, 16 FORUM 711, 712-13 (1981), liability insurance's role in the continued
growth of products liability law cannot be doubted.
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sion are inhibited because of uncertainty over the scope and
extent of coverage. The consumer protection provided by prod-
ucts liability law proves illusory when insurance coverage and
operating capital are inadequate to satisfy liability judgments.7
Unfortunately, complicated and ambiguous language
abounds in most liability insurance policies.8 The language of
7. In the mid-1970s, products liability insurance was alleged to be either
unavailable or unaffordable for many manufacturers. Schwartz, supra note 6,
at 711-12. One of the anticipated consequences of this situation was that prod-
ucts liability judgments would be unenforceable against these uninsured par-
ties. Id. at 712. In response to this fear, Congress passed the Product Liability
Risk Retention Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat. 949 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3901-3904 (1982)). This Act allows sellers to form "purchasing groups" for ob-
taining group-rate commercial insurance and "risk retention groups" for self-in-
suring as a body. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 714 see generally Shea, The
Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981, PRAC. LAw., Mar. 1, 1982, at 9.
8. A typical descripdon of liability insurance policy language is found in
Brainard v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 17 Misc. 2d 810, 812, 187 N.Y.S.2d 435, 437
(1959):
The Court cannot help but comment that the language, both in extent
and ambiguity, in modern insurance policies is an abomination. Inclu-
sions, exclusions, definitions and coverages set forth in the contracts
present the most formidable type of obfuscation which no trained per-
son, let alone a layman, can truthfully say is anything but the cant of
the insurers. It is, unfortunately, not within the province of this Court
to order that policies be written briefly and lucidly.
Despite the Brainard court's inhibition against compelling brief and lucid pol-
icy language, many courts attempt to achieve this result indirectly by strictly
construing ambiguities in the policy language against the insurer and by apply-
ing the doctrine of reasonable expectations, under which the reasonable cover-
age expectations of insureds are enforced. See generally Abraham, Judge-Made
Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the
Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981).
As contracts, insurance policies are governed by the rule of construction di-
recting that ambiguities be construed against the drafter, who in almost all in-
surance contexts is the insurer. 13 J. APPLEMArN & J. APPLzmAN, INsuRANcE LAw
AND PRAC77CE § 7401, at 197-246 (rev. ed. 1976). Liberal applications of this rule
have opened courts to charges of manufacturing ambiguities to justify cover-
age. See Kuvin, Liability Imposed by Law, 24 INS. CouNs. J. 153, 155-56 (1957).
The rule, however, remains a powerful incentive for clarifying policy language.
See Tinker, Comprehensive General Liabilty Insurance-Perspective and Over-
view, 25 FED'N INS. CouNs. Q. 217, 222 n.10 (1975) (crediting one policy revision
to court decision finding coverage based on policy ambiguities). The doctrine
of reasonable expectations's enforcing of insureds' coverage expectations has
likewise impelled language clarifications in hopes of reducing the expectations'
reasonableness.
Some state legislatures directly compel understandable language in insur-
ance policies by demanding that the policies meet standards of readability.
Best known are those statutes requiring the policies to pass the "Flesch Test,"
which measures readability by such factors as language technicality, number of
syllables per word, and sentence length. See, e.g., 31 PA. ADMmi. CODE § 64.12
(Shepard's 1980) (applies to policies covering private passenger automobiles);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 2B (West Supp. 1983) (applies to all insurance
policies of which more than 50 copies are delivered). Although simplicity of
language does not necessarily mean clarity of coverage, Tinker, supra, at 222,
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the liability policy most frequently purchased by commercial
ventures, the Comprehensive General Liability Policy
(CGLP),9 has generated enormous confusion over the coverage
it grants. The CGLP is a standardized liability policy promul-
gated by a group of organizations including the United States's
leading insurance companies.O It and other standardized lia-
bility policies were first developed in 194011 in response to con-
fusion resulting from the previous practice of each insurer
drafting its own policy provisions.12 These standardized provi-
sions have developed into virtual "boiler-plate" clauses for
most liability insurance forms.13
In a continuing effort to clarify insurers' coverage obliga-
tions and to keep trend with court decisions and the developing
needs of insureds, the policy forms were revised in 1943, 1955,
1966, and, most recently, in 1973.14 Both the 1966 and 1973 forms
remain important: the 1966 CGLP continues to dominate court
cases involving property damage liability coverage,' 5 but the
the statutes do focus the insurance industry's attention on insureds', rather
than courts', ability to understand policies.
9. See Tyler & Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Problems in Interpre-
tation and Application Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 17
IDAHo L. REV. 497, 498 (1981) (commercial ventures of all types most often use
the Comprehensive General Liability Policy for liability protection).
10. See Fish, An Overview of the 1973 Comprehensive General Liability In-
surance Policy and Products Liability Coverage, 34 J. Mo. B. 257, 257 (1978)
(most major capital stock and mutual insurance companies are members of the
drafting organization); Tinker, supra note 8, at 218-19 (same).
11. The first standard provisions policy of any kind was the basic automo-
bile liability policy issued in 1935 by the National Bureau of Casualty Under-
writers and the American Mutual Insurance Alliance. Tinker, supra note 8, at
218. There are presently some 20 different standardized liability policies. Other
primary policies include Owners, Landlords and Tenants; Manufacturers and
Contractors; Completed Operations and Products Liability; Contractural Liabil-
ity; Storekeeper's Liability; Druggists Liability; Comprehensive Personal Liabil-
ity; and Farm Employers' Liability and Farm Employees' Medical Payments. S.
HUEBNER, K. BLACK JR. & R. CLINE, supra note 4, at 356.
12. See Bardenwerperforeword to DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTrrTE, INC., No.
1, GENERAL LIABILrrY INsURAXE-1973 REVISIONS at 3 (1974).
13. See Fish, supra note 10, at 257 (most comprehensive general liability
policies use identical language); Tinker, supra note 8, at 219 (standardized
CGLP provisions establish the "norm" for all insurance companies).
14. Tinker, supra note 8, at 221. The Insurance Services Office, current
promulgator of the standard CGLPs, has issued two new revisions to be effec-
tive on November 1, 1985. See 1985 Comprehensive General Liability Policy
(unpublished policy issued by Insurance Services Office, Inc.) (1st rev. num-
bered GL 00 01 11 85; 2d rev. numbered GL 00 02 11 85).
15. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Time Corp., 704 F.2d 80,
83 (1983) (construing 1966 language); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co.,
544 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (same). Several reasons account for this con-
tinued dominance. First, many policies are written for a three-year period,
Tinker, supra note 8, at 218, and those written shortly before 1973 remained ef-
[Vol. 68:795
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1973 CGLP can be expected eventually to usurp this dominant
position.16
One acute difficulty presented by the two most recent
CGLP revisions stems from language granting coverage for lia-
bility awards imposed against insureds because of damage to
third persons' property.'7 The "Insuring Agreements" set forth
in the policies contain the operative language granting cover-
age,18 and explicitly control the outer limits of insurers' cover-
fective for that period, id. Moreover, some insurers continued to use the 1966
language for various insurance policies even after 1973 revision was introduced.
See, e.g., Willets Point Contracting Corp. v. Hartford Ins. Group, 75 A.D.2d 254,
429 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1980) (umbrella liability policy issued in 1975). In addition,
the 1966 as well as the 1973 policy is "occurrence" based. If the property dam-
age occurs during the policy period, the CGLP covers liability resulting from
actions brought within the statute of limitations, even if the policy period has
since expired. Because of liberal judicial constructions of when applicable stat-
utes of limitations begin to run and when property damage occurs, the 1966 and
1973 policies contemplate a long "tail" of liability. See Shea, Better Insurance
and Contractual Protection from Product Liabilty, PRAc. LAW., Mar. 1, 1983, at
45, 46-47. One of the 1985 CGLP revisions, however, eliminates this tail by cov-
ering only claims made during the policy period. See 1985 Comprehensive Gen-
eral Liability Policy, supra note 14, § 1, coverage A, 1(b), at 1 (2d rev.). Finally,
the slow movement of claims through court dockets undoubtedly contributes to
the repeated appearance of the 1966 policy language in decisions.
16. The 1966 policy should appear less frequently in court disputes as stat-
utes of limitations run and court dockets clear with the passage of time. The
1973 policy's appearances should increase concurrently.
17. Coverage under this language should not be confused with that
granted by property and other casualty insurance. Liability insurance does not
provide compensation for the property damage, but only protects the insured
against legal liability incurred because of the damage.
18. The policies are actually composed of three parts: the Declarations
part, the General Liability jacket part, and the Comprehensive General Liabil-
ity part. The Declarations part contains the names of the insurer and the in-
sured, the premium amount, and other items particular to the parties'
relationship. The General Liability jacket part contains provisions common to
all standardized liability policies, such as policy definitions, general conditions,
and supplementary payments. Obrist, New Comprehensive General Liability
Insurance Policy, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC., No. 30, THE NEW CoM-
PREHENSrVE GENERAL LIABILrIT INSURANCE PoLcy-A COVERAGE ANALYsis 6
(1966), reprinted in DEFENSE RESEARCH INsTrrTE, INC., No. 1, supra note 12, at
37. The Comprehensive General Liability part contains several provisions ap-
plicable to the particular coverage, entitled Exclusions, Persons Insured, Limits
of Liability, Policy Period, and Territory. Reichenberger, The General Liability
Insurance Policies-Analysis of 1973 Revisions, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE, INC., No. 1, supra note 12, at 5, 13-18. When the Declarations, General Lia-
bility, and Comprehensive General Liability parts are combined, a complete
CGLP is formed.
The 1966 revision initiated the three-part format in response to confusion
engendered by the former practice, which included all coverages in one basic
policy form and indicated by a premium entry those coverages purchased by
the insured. Bardenwerper, supra note 12, at 3; see, e.g., Maretti v. Midland
Nat'l Ins. Co., 42 Ill. App. 2d 17, 28, 190 N.E.2d 597, 602 (1963) (describing one
pre-1966 policy as containing "such a bewildering array of exclusions, defini-
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age obligations.19 No coverage exists under the policies if it is
not triggered by the Insuring Agreements. 20 The 1966 and 1973
Insuring Agreements contain identical language obligating the
insurer "to pay on behalf of the insured all sums for which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages be-
cause of . . . property damage to which this [policy] applies
caused by an occurrence."2 1 The clause obligating the insurer
to pay all "damages because of ... property damage" that the
insured is legally liable to pay principally governs coverage for
property damage liability. Despite its facially simple language,
this clause yields several perplexing issues concerning the cov-
erage it grants, and although it has engendered an immense
body of judicial discussion, it has received little detailed analy-
sis by insurance commentators.
This Note examines questions concerning the scope of cov-
erage for property damage liability granted by the 1966 and 1973
CGLP's "damages because of ... property damage" clause.
Part I focuses on what types of damage qualify as "property
damage," considering the types of property covered and the re-
quired form of damage. Part II examines the proper construc-
tion of the policies' "because of" requirement, determining
what types of consequential damages arising from property
damage are covered. The Note resolves what coverage should
be inferred from the CGLP property damage provision and con-
trasts results under the 1966 and 1973 revisions.
I. THE "DAMAGES BECAUSE OF... PROPERTY
DAMAGE" CLAUSE
All coverage disputes bred by the clause "damages because
of... property damage" center around the meaning and role of
tions and conditions that the result is confounding almost to the point of being
unintelligible"). The format has proven relatively successful, with the 1973 and
1985 policies retaining the three-part package.
19. Tinker, supra note 8, at 222-23. Among standardized, business-related
liability policies, the CGLP contains the broadest and most liberal Insuring
Agreement. See H. LEGG, A BRIEF OUTINE OF INSURANCE 109-10 (1971). This
undoubtedly contributes to the CGLP's continued popularity as the primary in-
suring instrument used by commercial ventures. See supra note 9 and accom-
panying text.
20. See Tinker, supra note 8, at 223.
21. See Gowan, Completed Operations and Products Liability Insurance
Coverage of the New Comprehensive General-Automobile Policy, 1966 A.B.
SEc. INs., NEGL. & COMPENSATION L 265, 285 app. (reprinting 1966 Insuring
Agreement at 283-93 app.); Tinker, supra note 8, at 300 app. (reprinting 1973 In-
suring Agreement at 287-308 apps. A & B). The 1985 revision retains the lan-
guage of the 1966 and 1973 Insuring Agreements.
[Vol. 68:795
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the term "property damage," which the CGLP drafters defined
in both the 1966 and 1973 revisions. The 1966 definition is mis-
leadingly simple, defining "property damage" as "injury to or
destruction of tangible property."2 2 After this simple language
caused problems in determining the scope of coverage for prop-
erty damage liability, the 1973 revision redefined "property
damage" as:
(1) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs
during the policy period, including the loss of use thereof at any time
resulting therefrom, or (2) loss of use of tangible property which has
not been physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of use is
caused by an occurrence during the policy period... 23
Disputes over the scope of coverage for property damage liabil-
ity granted by the "damages because of... property damage"
clause result from difficulties in interpreting and applying
these definitions. Questions of interpretation arise from uncer-
tainty over the type of "property"24 and the form of "damage" 25
contemplated by the "property damage" definitions.
A. TYPE OF "PROPERTY" THAT MUST BE DAMAGED
Prior to the 1966 revision, the standard CGLP forms pro-
vided coverage for "injury to or destruction of property."26
Courts in cases such as Wells Labberton v. General Casualty
Co.27 concluded that the generic term "property" in pre-1966
policies could "reasonably be construed to include obligations,
rights and other intangibles."28 To circumvent such reasoning,
the 1966 revisions qualified "property" with "tangible," and this
clarification was retained in the 1973 policy. By specifying "tan-
gible" property, the 1966 and 1973 "property damage" defini-
tions contemplate only property which is physical-capable of
being touched and objectively perceivable---29 and not incorpo-
22. Gowan, supra note 21, at 284 (1966 Insuring Agreement).
23. Tinker, supra note 8, at 295 (1973 Insuring Agreement). The 1985 revi-
sion retains the 1973 "property damage" definition, with only a minor editorial
change.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 26-43.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 44-92.
26. Narko, The 1972 Comprehensive General Liability Policy: Response to a
Continuing Need, 61 ILL. B.J. 34, 34-35 (1972); see J. LONG & D. GREGG, supra
note 3, at 1188.
27. 53 Wash. 2d 180, 332 P.2d 250 (1958) (defective fertilizer applicator
sprayed fields inadequately, diminishing wheat yield).
28. See id. at 186-87, 332 P.2d at 254 (quoting Citizens State Bank v. Vidal,
114 F.2d 380, 382-83 (10th Cir. 1940)).
29. Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (prop-
erty assignment and fees are not capable of being touched, and therefore, are
not tangible property); Spoor-Lasher Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 48
19841
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real "obligations, rights and other intangibles."30 These revi-
sions eliminate coverage of items traditionally referred to as
"intangible property," including property that represents value
but has no intrinsic marketable value of its own (such as
stock,31 investments, 32 copyrights, 33 and promissory notes 34 ),
property regarded as intangible rights (such as goodwil 3 5 and
reputation 36), and economic interests (such as overhead,37 prof-
A.D.2d 938, 939, 369 N.Y.S.2d 811, 814 (1975) (the arbitrary closing off of a street
causing a merchant to lose revenue because its premises were inaccessible to
the public is not damage to tangible property).
30. The insurance industry's decision to avoid further application of the
Labberton "obligations, rights and other intangibles" reasoning is understanda-
ble. Most successful liability judgments hinge on injuries to "legally enforcea-
ble claim[s] of one person against another, that the other shall do a given act
or shall not do a given act." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 1 (1936). Al-
though many of these injuries may be the proper subject of specialized insur-
ance, a form tailored for wide use is not intended for such indiscriminate
application. See J. LONG & D. GREGG, supra note 3, at 502. Moreover, the broad
definition of "property" would inject a measure of unpredictability into an in-
.dustry that relies for its profit on its ability to make accurate predictions. See
C. ELior, PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INsURANCE 7 (1960) ('ro a very great ex-
tent, the success of the insurance operation will depend upon the relationship
of the actual loss ratio (the actual amount of money paid for losses relative to
the premiums earned) to the expected loss ratio."). Courts are constantly rec-
ognizing new intangible property rights, such as the right to enjoy unrestricted
sunlight, see Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982), and the
right to share in government largess, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(state cannot deny unemployment benefits on grounds encroaching on freedom
of religion); see generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (ex-
amining new forms of property created by government largess). Limiting cov-
erage to damage to "tangible" property restricts coverage of these new
judicially-created intangible property rights.
31. Cf. Giddings v. Industrial Indem. Co., 112 Cal. App. 3d 213, 218-19, 169
Cal. Rptr. 278, 281 (1980) ("Moreover, strictly economic losses like lost profits,
loss of goodwill, loss of the anticipated benefit of a bargain, and loss of an in-
vestment, do not constitute damage or injury to tangible property covered by a
comprehensive general liability policy.").
32. See id., 169 Cal. Rptr. at 281; Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Case
Found. Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 115, 123-24, 294 N.E.2d 7, 13-14 (1973).
33. See General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Chopot, 28 Wash. App. 383, 386, 623 P.2d
730, 732 (1981).
34. Cf Temco Metal Prods. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 273 Or.
716, 717-18, 543 P.2d 1, 2 (1975) (payment of money on forged checks does not
constitute injury to or destruction of tangible property).
35. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Milk Producers' Ass'n,
354 F. Supp. 879, 882-84 (D.N.H. 1973); Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul Mer-
cury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 558, 565-66, 334 P.2d 881, 885-86 (1959); Ludwig Candy
Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 78 Ili. App. 3d 306, 308-10, 396 N.E.2d 1329, 1331-32
(1979).
36. See, e.g., Johnston v. Tally Ho, Inc., 303 A.2d 677, 679 (Del. Super. Ct.
1973); Ludwig Candy Co., 78 Ill. App. 3d at 308-10, 396 N.E.2d at 1331-32.
37. See Hogan v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 3 Cal. 3d 553, 561-63, 91 Cal. Rptr.
153, 157-58, 476 P.2d 825, 830 (1970); Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul Mercury
Indem. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 558, 565-66, 334 P.2d 881, 885-86 (1959); American States
Ins. Co. v. Hurd Bros., Inc., 8 Wash. App. 867, 870, 509 P.2d 1015, 1017 (1973).
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its,38 investment value,3 9 and productivity 40).
The boundaries of the "property damage" definitions can
be visualized by considering a third party's factory which col-
lapses through an insured's negligence. The factory is tangible
property, and one strand of the "property damage" definitions
is satisfied.41 The lost profits suffered by the third party as a
result of the factory's collapse, however, are economic losses,
which are intangible and thus outside the "property damage"
definitions.42 Thus, the collapse of the factory may constitute
'property damage" while injuries flowing from it do not.4 3
B. FORM OF "DAMAGE" THAT THE TANGIBLE PROPERTY MUST
SUFFER
Not only must the damaged property be tangible, but the
damage must be in a form specified by the definitions. The 1966
'property damage" definition demands that "injury to or de-
struction of' tangible property be shown, whereas the more
precise 1973 definition requires proof of "physical injury to,"
"destruction of," or "loss of use of" tangible property.
Coverage under the definitions is uncontested when the
tangible property's material substance is damaged, or, as it is
more commonly phrased in insurance policies, when physical
38. See Lowenstein Dyes & Cosmetics v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 524 F.
Supp. 574, 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); McCollum v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 132 Ariz.
129, 131-32, 644 P.2d 283, 285-86 (1982); Ludwig Candy Co. v. Iowa Natl Mut. Ins.
Co., 78 Ill. App. 3d 306, 310, 396 N.E.2d 1329, 1332 (1979).
39. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Case Found. Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 115,
123-24, 294 N.E.2d 7, 13-14 (1973); cf. McCollum v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 132
Ariz. 129, 132, 644 P.2d 283, 285-86 (1982) (loss of future profit).
40. Sentry Ins. Co. v. S & L Home Heating Co., 91 Ill. App. 3d 687, 690, 414
N.E.2d 1218, 1221 (1980).
41. To satisfy the other strand requires a showing that the tangible prop-
erty suffered the requisite form of damage. See infra text accompanying notes
44-92.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 29-40.
43. Coverage may still exist for damages compensating for the lost profits,
however, if the collapsed factory is found to be covered "property damage."
Then, the lost profits would result from property damage and the award may be
covered as "damages because of ... property damage." See infra text accom-
panying notes 93-128.
The impact of defining "property damage" to exclude intangible losses
from direct coverage will vary for different ventures. Ventures must examine
the essential purposes for which they require liability insurance and plan ac-
cordingly. A newspaper, for instance, would not be sufficiently covered under
the 1966 and 1973 CGLPs because those policies do not protect against liability
for libel, which concerns damage to the injured party's reputation-an intangi-
ble right. The newspaper would be better protected against libel risks under a
version of a personal injury liability insurance policy or under a specialized
policy for newspapers.
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
injury to tangible property has occurred. "Destruction of' tan-
gible property is explicitly provided for under both "property
damage" definitions. Substantive damage that is less than total
destruction is also encompassed under the definitions as a
"physical injury." Although only the 1973 policy specifically in-
cludes "physical injury to" tangible property, the 1966 defini-
tion's unqualified "injury to" tangible property cannot
reasonably be interpreted to exclude physical injuries.44
Not all forms of damage to tangible property, however, af-
fect its material substance. Some types of damage decrease
the property's value without changing its physical makeup.
The "property damage" definitions blur when nonphysical inju-
ries occur. Whether the nonphysical injuries of lost use45 and
diminished value46 of tangible property constitute "property
damage" present the principal issues in this definition.
1. Lost Use of Tangible Property.
Lost use of tangible property occurs when the insured's
product is incorporated into a larger tangible entity and the in-
corporated product causes the entire entity to fail. For exam-
ple, a motor supplied by the insured is incorporated into an
engine. The motor fails, but no physical harm occurs to the
rest of the engine.4 7 The motor's failure, however, may de-
crease or eliminate use of the entire engine. A more concep-
44. Rotted potatoes, see Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 372
F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rusted roofs, see Yakima Cement Prods. Co. v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 22 Wash. App. 536, 590 P.2d 371, rev'd, 608 P.2d 254 (1980),
cut cables, see C.W. Davis Supply Co. v. Newwark Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.S.2d 127
(1969), and torn paper gaskets, see Elco Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 90 Ill.
App. 3d 1106, 414 N.E.2d 41 (1980), are all physically injured tangible property,
and are considered '"property damage" under the definitions.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 47-71.
46. See infra: text accompanying notes 72-92.
47. Property damage to the motor itself is excluded from coverage under
the CGLP-liability insurance policies are not meant to be performance bonds.
Although the insured may be legally liable for the defective quality of its work
or product, no coverage exists for property damage to these items under the
CGLP. Both the 1966 and 1973 policies exclude coverage for (1) "property dam-
age to the named insured's products arising out of such products," and (2)
"property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named insured
arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or
equipment furnished in connection therewith." Gowan, supra note 21, at 287
app. (exclusions (1) and (m) in the 1966 policy); Tinker, supra note 8, at 303
app. (exclusions (n) and (o) in the 1973 policy). These exclusions do not apply
to other property damage arising out of such products or work. 3A L FRUMER &
M. FRIEDMANI, PRODUCTS LABnrrY § 50.01B(1), at 19-18, and § 50.01B (2), at 19-24
(rev. ed. 1979); see e.g., Pittsburgh Bridge & Iron Works v. Liability Mut. Ins.
Co., 444 F.2d 1286, 1290 (3d Cir. 1971) (damage to tramway containing insured's
defective saddle not within exclusionary clause); Paxton-Mitchell Co. v. Royal
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tually difficult situation arises when the tangible property is
not physically incapable of full use, but prevention of meaning-
ful access causes it to stand idle or to operate at less than full
capacity. To illustrate, a crane collapses in front of a supermar-
ket entrance. Because of the blockage, the store is incapable of
being used. Thus, a loss of use of tangible property has oc-
curred.4 8 Because lost use of tangible property often arises un-
accompanied by physical injury, resolution of whether it
constitutes "property damage" under the CGLP is extremely
important.
Questions about the inclusion of lost use of tangible prop-
erty occur only in conjunction with the 1966 "property damage"
definition because the 1973 policy explicitly includes, in section
(2) of its "property damage" definition, "loss of use of tangible
property which has not been physically injured or destroyed."49
The 1966 policy, unfortunately, contains no such clear language.
The only reference to loss of use in the 1966 policy comes in the
Indem. Co., 279 Or. 607, 613-16, 569 P.2d 581, 585-87 (1977) (damage to truck
equipped with insured's cranes not within exclusionary clause).
48. Wendorff The New Standard Comprehensive General Liability Insur-
ance Policy, 1966 A.B.A. SEC. INs., NEGL & COMPENSATION L. 250, 256. This illus-
tration was used in the drafters' guidelines to the 1966 CGLP to illustrate loss
of use of tangible property and its treatment under the policy. See Tinker,
supra note 8, at 232; 3A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, § 50.01A, at 19-
16. An unusual fact situation involving the same principle was presented in
Cute'-Togs of New Orleans, Inc. v. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 So.
2d 999 (La. App. 1979), rev'd on other ground, 386 So. 2d 87 (La. 1980), where
an employee's absence caused machinery to stand idle. The employee quit
when he discovered defendant's negligent failure to process his medical insur-
ance policy. 376 So. 2d at 1000. The court held that the equipment's idleness
was loss of use of tangible property. See id. at 1001.
Loss of use must be distinguished from loss of the right to use. In the lat-
ter situation, the tangible property remains fully operational but the intangible
right to enjoy is blocked. See Inland Constr. Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.
258 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Minn. 1977) (conversion injures only owner's intangible
right to enjoy property). But see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Mayor's
Jewelers, 384 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1980) (stolen property is rendered totally use-
less).
Lost use of tangible property must also be distinguished from lost produc-
tivity. Productivity is an economic term which measures the amount of output
per unit of time. Lost productivity is loss of an anticipated economic benefit-
an intangible injury outside the "property damage" definitions. See Sentry Ins.
Co. v. S & L Home Heating Co., 91 Ill. App. 3d 687, 690-91, 414 N.E.2d 1218, 1221-22
(1980) (employees' lost productivity not '"property damage"). Lost productiv-
ity, however, may be evidence of lost use of tangible property. See American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 544 F. Supp. 669, 683 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (reduced
usefulness of plant shown by loss of productivity). The two terms, however,
should not be used synonymously. But see Borden, Inc. v. Howard Trucking
Co., 372 So. 2d 242, 244 (La. App. 1979) (loss of use and loss of productivity used
interchangably).
49. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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"damages" definition, which states that "'damages' includes
... damages for loss of use of property resulting from property
damage."5 0 This omission leaves room for argument on both
sides concerning whether lost use of tangible property is "prop-
erty damage" under this revision.
Some commentators argue that the 1966 definition's qualifi-
cation requiring loss of use of property to result from property
damage implies physical injury to tangible property.5 ' They
contend that interpreting the "property damage" definition to
include nonphysical injuries to tangible property would neces-
sarily include the nonphysical injury of loss of use of tangible
property and thus would render the reference to "loss of use of
property resulting from property damage" superfluous and
meaningless. In order to follow long-established rules of con-
struction requiring that all words in a policy be recognized as
having a purpose, these commentators require a physical in-
jury to satisfy the 1966 "property damage" definition of "injury
to or destruction of tangible property."52 As a nonphysical in-
jury, lost use of tangible property is not "property damage,"
and is covered only when it "result[s] from property damage"
as required by the "damages" definition.
Although some case law supports the above argument,5 3 a
majority of courts and commentators consider loss of use of
property to constitute "property damage" under the 1966 pol-
icy.54 Proponents of this position generally rely on one of two
relatively unpersuasive rationales. The first finds that the ref-
50. Gowan, supra note 21, at 283. This separate "damages" definition was
eliminated entirely by the 1973 revision. See Reichenberger, supra note 18, at
10.
51. See, e.g., Tarpey, The New Comprehensive Policy: Some of the Changes,
33 INs. CouNs. J. 223, 227 (1966); Tinker, supra note 8, at 232-33.
52. See Tinker, supra note 8, at 232-33.
53. See, e.g., Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 548 F.2d 681, 687
(7th Cir. 1977) (uselessness of housing structure for brake resulting from
brake's defectiveness not "property damage"; "actual" injury required); Willets
Point Contracting Corp. v. Hartford Ins. Group, 75 A.D.2d 254, 258-59, 429
N.Y.S.2d 230, 233 (1980), affid, 53 N.Y. 879, 440 N.Y.S.2d 619, 423 N.E.2d 42 (1981)
(business's lost use through wrongful access blockage not "property damage"
under 1966 policy); see also, e.g., Hamilton Die Cast, Inc. v. United States Fidel-
ity & Guar. Co., 508 F.2d 417, 419-20 (7th Cir. 1977) (incorporation of defective
threading into tennis rackets not physical injury and therefore not '"property
damage").
54. See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 544 F. Supp. 669, 682-
83 (W.D. Wis.) (plant's decreased operating capacity is "property damage"),
affid, 718 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1982); Cute'-Togs of New Orleans, Inc. v. Louisiana
Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 376 So. 2d 999 (La. App. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 386 So. 2d 87 (La. 1980) (machinery's lost use is property damage);
Obrist, supra note 18, at 7 (lost use of tangible property is "property damage");
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erence to lost use in the "damages" definition evidences the
drafters' intent to include lost use of tangible property as
"property damage."55 This justification, however, ignores the
qualification in the "damages" definition requiring that lost use
result from property damage.5 6 The "damages" definition
facially distinguishes between "loss of use of property" and
"property damage" rather than equating them.
The second justification concludes that lost use of tangible
property is "property damage" within the terms of the defini-
tion itself. "Injury" as used in the 1966 "property damage" defi-
nition of "injury to or destruction of tangible property"S7 is not
separately defined. Because undefined words are given their
"common, popular and ordinary meaning" under rules of insur-
ance policy construction,5 8 proponents of coverage argue that
"injury" can be reasonably construed as including both physi-
cal and nonphysical harm or damage.5 9 Loss of use of tangible
property is certainly a harm to that property and, thus, is
"property damage" under the 1966 definition. This justification,
however, reads the "property damage" definition in a contex-
tual vacuum. When the "property damage" definition is inter-
preted as including lost use of property, the "damages"
definition must be read as embracing only "damages for loss of
use of property" for the two definitions to lie together consist-
ently. This reading effectively removes the remainder of the
"damages" definition, which states that loss of use is included
when "resulting from property damage."60
Consequently, both supporters and opponents of including
lost use of tangible property in the 1966 '"property damage" def-
Wendorif, supra note 48, at 255-56 (same); 3 R. LONG, LAW OF IZABLITY INSUR-
ANCE app. B § 6, at 38 app. (rev. ed. 1974) (same).
55. See, e.g., 3 R. LONG, supra note 54, at 38 app. ('Tangible property ren-
dered useless is injured and hence is covered, since the definition of damages
includes 'loss of use of property resulting from property damage."').
56. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
57. See supra text accompanying note 22.
58. 13 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 8, § 7384, at 71; 1 C. COUCH,
COUCH: CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 15:17, at 671 (2d ed. 1959).
59. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Mayor's Jewelers, 384 So.
2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1980) ("injury" is any wrong or damage, including nonphysical
damage); Yaldma Cement Prods. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 22 Wash. App. 536,
545, 590 P.2d 371, 376 (1979) (both physical and nonphysical damage covered
under the definition), rev'd on other grounds, 93 Wash. 2d 210, 608 P.2d 254
(1980); Pittway Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 370 N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (Ill.
App. 1977) (same). But see Temco Metal Prods. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 273 Or. 716, 718, 543 P.2d 1, 2 (1975) (injury to inanimate object ordina-
rily construed as physical injury).
60. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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inition advance their position by essentially rewriting the pol-
icy language. Supporters omit the phrase "resulting from
property damage" in the "damages" definition,61 while oppo-
nents add the qualifying term "physical" before "injury to or
destruction of tangible property."62 Although questionable
from the standpoint of technical interpretation, including lost
use of tangible property within the "property damage" defini-
tion appears to be the proper interpretation, given the desire to
fulfill insureds' coverage expectations. It is doubtful whether a
reasonable insured would give the "damages" and "property
damage" definitions the technical reading required to conclude
that physical injury to tangible property is necessary to satisfy
the 1966 "property damage" definition. Such delicate shadings
have escaped even the most knowledgeable of insurance com-
mentators. 63 Moreover, courts do not favor technical construc-
tions that violate common sense.64 If the drafters had intended
to require a physical injury, they would presumably have quali-
fied the definition explicitly6 rather than relying on a strained
and technical construction.
An explanatory memorandum prepared by the drafters in
conjunction with the 1966 policy bolsters this conclusion:
This definition [of "property damage"], together with the definition of
"damages," is intended to produce the same effect as present policies.
The definition limits coverage to legal damages for injury to tangible
property... But, of course, damages for injury to tangible property
include as before, damages for its loss of use.6 6
The drafters' intent to reproduce the previous policies' effect
under the 1966 policy is instructive. By 1966, several cases in-
terpreting the language "injury to or destruction of property"
contained in the pre-1966 policies 67 had held that "injury" en-
compassed both physical and nonphysical damage.68 Commen-
61. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
63. See, e.g., Obrist, supra note 18, at 7; ("property damage" definition in-
cludes loss of use of tangible property); Wendorf; supra note 48, at 255-56
(same); 3 R. LONG, supra note 54, at 38 app. (same).
64. See Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Preston, 287 Ala.
493, 496, 253 So. 2d 4, 6 (1971); Cook v. National Fidelity & Casualty Co., 100 Neb.
641, 646, 160 N.W. 957, 958 (1916); Continental Casualty Co. v. Summerfield, 87
Nev. 127, 134 482 P.2d 308, 312 (1971).
65. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Mayor's Jewelers, 384 So. 2d
256, 258 (Fla. 1980) ("If... property is damaged only when it suffers actual,
physical damage, it would have been relatively simple to include the word
'physical' in its definition.").
66. See Wendorff, supra note 48, at 255.
67. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 298 F.2d 151, 153 (6th
Cir. 1962) (heating system suffered "property damage" when rendered useless
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tators suggested prior to the completion of the 1966 policy that
this interpretation could be avoided by qualifying "injury" with
the word "physical."69 By ignoring this suggestion, the drafters
implicitly manifested their intent to allow the nonphysical in-
terpretation to continue. In addition, the filing memorandum7 0
prepared by the 1973 drafters indicates that the new "property
damage" definition specifically covering lost use of tangible
property was designed to clarify, not change, the intent of the
1966 provision.1 The fair and reasonable reading of the 1966
"property damage" definition, therefore, includes nonphysical
injuries to tangible property.
2. Diminution in Value of Tangible Property.
An insured frequently incurs liability when its defective
work or product forms a component in another's tangible prop-
erty, causing diminution in value of that tangible property.7 2 A
defective motor, for example, can cause an engine to diminish
in market value, and the engine's diminished value can result
in legal liability for the motor's supplier.73
The 1966 policy should be interpreted as covering diminu-
by defective tubing); Hauenstein v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn.
354, 357-58, 65 N.W.2d 122, 125 (1954) (diminution in house value due to defec-
tive plaster is 'property damage").
69. See, e.g., Andersen, Current Problems in Products Liability Law and
Products Liabiity Insurance, 31 INs. CouNs. J. 436, 446 (1964).
70. State laws require prior approval of insurance contracts before they
can be marketed within the state. The usual procedure is to "file" these con-
tracts with the insurance commissioner or other appropriate official. J. LONG &
D. GREGG, supra note 3, at 239.
71. Tinker, supra note 8, at 232.
72. See, e.g., Yakima Cement Prods. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 22 Wash.
App. 536, 590 P.2d 371 (1979) (defective panels), rev'd, 93 Wash. 2d 210, 608 P.2d
254 (1980); Pittway Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d 338, 370
N.E.2d 1271 (1977) (defective valves in aerosol cans); Sturges Mfg. Co. v. Utica
Mut. Ins. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 69, 72-73, 332 N.E.2d 319, 322, 371 N.Y.S.2d 444, 447 (1975)
(defective ski bindings).
73. Cf. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 544 F. Supp. 669, 683 (W.D.
Wis. 1982) (defective heat exchangers caused plant to diminish in value), affld,
718 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1982). The property's present value must actually de-
crease. When it merely fails to increase in value, the loss is of anticipated prof-
its, an intangible injury not included within the "property damage" definitions.
See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text, see, e.g., McCollum v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 132 Ariz. 129, 132, 644 P.2d 283, 286 (1982) (insureds' failure to
make agreed-upon improvements to real property is loss of speculative profits,
and not "property damage"); Fresno Economy Import Used Cars, Inc. v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 76 Cal. App. 3d 272, 279, 142 Cal. Rptr. 681, 685 (1977)
(false representation that car is more valuable than it is causes loss of antici-
pated value but is not '"property damage"); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Western
Am. Dev. Co., 43 Or. App. 671, 675, 603 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1979) (property which is
merely worth less than expected is not "property damage").
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tion in value. Under the technical reading of the 1966 CGLP im-
plying the condition of '"physical" injury in the "injury to or
destruction of tangible property" language,74 diminution in
value would not be "property damage" because it is a nonphys-
ical injury to tangible property. This construction, however,
contradicts common sense, as discussed above.
75 The "injury"
in the "property damage" definition must be construed as in-
cluding both physical and nonphysical injury.7 6 Diminution in
value of tangible property harms that property, and thus consti-
tutes the "injury to or destruction of tangible property" re-
quired by the 1966 "property damage" definition.77
The result is different under the 1973 "property damage"
definition. Section (1) of the 1973 CGLP covers "physical injury
to or destruction of tangible property,"78 while section (2)
74. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
77. See cases cited supra note 72. See also cases interpreting the pre-1966
"injury to or destruction of property" to include diminution in value of prop-
erty, e.g., Bowman Steel Corp. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 364 F.2d 246,
249 (3d Cir. 1966) (defective siding caused diminution in value of building);
Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 51 CaL 2d 558, 565, 334
P.2d 881, 885 (1959) (defective doors caused diminution in value of houses),
modified and affd, 63 Cal. 2d 602, 407 P.2d 868, 47 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1965); Hauen-
stein v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354, 357-58, 65 N.W.2d 122, 125
(1954) (defective plaster caused diminution in value of building). The defective
work or product can contribute, of course, to the diminution in value. To avoid
confronting policy provisions excluding coverage for property damage to in-
sureds' work or product, see supra note 47, several courts require a diminution
in value in excess of the value of the defective incorporated work or product.
See, e.g., Goodyear Rubber & Supply Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 471 F.2d 1343,
1344 (9th Cir. 1973) (damage to ship greatly exceeded cost of defective gaskets);
Sturges Mfg. Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 69, 72-73, 332 N.E.2d 319, 322,
371 N.Y.S.2d 444, 447 (1975) (diminution in value caused by defective ski straps
must exceed cost of strap replacements).
A unique argument against allowing diminution in value to constitute "in-
jury to or destruction of tangible property" was set forth in obiter dicta in
Stone & Webster Eng'g v. American Motorist Ins., 458 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Va.
1978), affid, 628 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1980). The court stated that to allow diminu-
tion in value of tangible property to constitute "property damage" would mean
that any event that diminishes property values, including wars, strikes, and in-
terest rate increases, would result in "property damage," and such coverage
was beyond the parties' contemplation. 458 F. Supp. at 796 n.1. The error in the
court's reasoning is the conclusion that all injuries that meet the "property
damage" definition are covered by the policy. For instance, under the terms of
the Insuring Agreements, the insured must be "legally obligated" to pay "dam-
ages" before the policy will cover the property damage. See supra text accom-
panying note 21. Except under extreme circumstances, legal liability for
damages will not be imposed upon an insured for wars, strikes, or interest rates
increases. Consequently, injuries resulting from those events can satisfy the
"property damage" definition, yet not be covered.
78. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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reaches only the "loss of use of tangible property which has not
been physically injured. '79 Although courts and commentators
have yet to fully confront or recognize this issue, diminution in
value of tangible property does not fall within either category,
and thus, presumably, is not "property damage" under the 1973
policy.
Because the policy does not separately define the term
"physical injury" in section (1),80 "diminution in value" could
be covered if regarded as a "physical injury." Although some
cases have loosely referred to diminution in value in this way,81
such a characterization is improper. Physical injury's "com-
mon, popular and ordinary meaning"82 envisions material, sub-
stantive, and objectively perceivable harm. Diminution in
value of tangible property is an incorporeal and intangible
harm measured by market forces, not an injury to the material
substance of the tangible property. Moreover, to interpret
"physical injury" as encompassing diminution in value would
render the word "physical" in the phrase meaningless. 83 Dimi-
nution in value of tangible property also does not fit within the
CGLP's section (2). Diminution in value of tangible property is
not synonymous with loss of use of tangible property. Al-
though the two injuries may coexist in some fact situations,
they differ in character and measurement. For example, a
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., McCollum v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 132 Ariz. 129, 131, 644
P.2d 283, 285 (1982) (characterizing diminution-in-value precedents as holding
that an actual, physical injury must be shown); Aetna Ins. Co. v. State Motors
Inc., 109 N.H. 120, 123o24, 244 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1968). The policy in Aetna defined
'"property damage" as "physical injury to or destruction of tangible property."
The court relied on precedents construing the pre-1973 language to include
diminution in value of tangible property to conclude that "[tihe above cases
clearly establish that recovery may be had for property damage, including dimi-
nution in market value, which may result to tangible property other than the
property purchased from the insured." Id. at 124, 244 A.2d at 67. The court then
found that the property damage of diminished value of tangible property was
excluded under a separate policy provision. See id., 244 A.2d at 67.
The Aetna court made the common mistake of examining previous case
law rather than the present policy. An insurance policy is a contract and is
governed by its provisions. Although case law can and should be examined
when the policy provisions are the same (or differ in only irrelevant respects),
the addition of the word "physical" in the definition the court was examining
made the policy substantially different from those involved in previous cases.
82. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
83. See Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 282 Or. 401, 406,
578 P.2d 1253, 1256 (1978) (en bane) ('"The inclusion of this word ["physical"]
negates any possibility that the policy was intended to include ... depreciation
in value, within the term 'property damage'. The intention to exclude such cov-
erage can be the only reason for the addition of the word.").
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structure covered with defective siding that mottles and discol-
ors may be fully useful even though its market value is dimin-
ished as a result of its unsightly appearance. 84 Neither section
of the 1973 property damage definition, therefore, expressly
covers diminution in value.
The narrower scope of the 1973 definition can be expected
to change the manner in which insureds, and courts sympa-
thetic to insureds, designate the harm resulting in liability.85
One method of including under the 1973 definition many inju-
ries traditionally termed as diminution in value of tangible
property would be to characterize them as physical injuries
under an "accession" theory. "Accession" derives from ancient
property principles that regarded anything fixed to realty as
part of that realty.86 Application of the accession theory, in cer-
tain circumstances, could support a finding that an entity is
physically injured by the incorporation of a defective part.
Under the accession theory, the defective product would be-
come an inseparable part of the entity. The defects in the prod-
uct would therefore be defects in the entity and, arguably,
"physical injury" to the entity.
A version of this theory was applied in Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.87 The insured's paint
flaked and peeled after being applied to jalousies, a type of ve-
netian blind. The policy language defined property damage as
"physical injury to or physical destruction of tangible prop-
erty."88 In concluding that property damage had occurred, the
court stated:
Once the paint has been baked on to the steel and aluminum parts of
the jalousies, the paint is no longer identifiable as a separate entity but
is intended to and does become a part of the finished product. Thereaf-
ter, any damage to the finished product, such as flaking or peeling of
paint, is property damage covered by the liability insurance policies
84. Cf. Hauenstein v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354, 65
N.W.2d 122 (1954) (appearance of defective plaster caused house's diminution
in value); Dakota Block Co. v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co. 81 S.D. 213, 132
N.W.2d 826 (1965) (discolored bricks caused diminution in value of school
building), affid in part, rev'd in part 82 S.D. 546, 150 N.W.2d 729 (1967).
85. Curiously, neither the drafters nor the commentators have commented
on the noninclusion of diminished value of tangible property under the 1973
"property damage" definition. With no published opinions responding directly
to the noninclusion, the courts' reaction to the discontinuance of a favored cov-
erage trigger of the 1966 policy is as yet uncertain.
86. Handler v. Horns, 2 N.J. 18, 23-24, 65 A.2d 523, 526 (1949) (trade fixtures
removable if removal achieved without material damage to premises).
87. 281 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1960).
88. Id. at 539 n.1.
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here in question.8 9
Although courts may be tempted to revive the theory to
trigger inclusion of the injury under the 1973 "property dam-
age" definition,90 such a move should be rejected.91 Accession
would inject an increased uncertainty into the 1973 "property
damage" definition. Accession concepts are undeveloped in in-
surance contract law, leaving unclear how the product must ad-
here to the entity, what form of injury or defects the product
must suffer to physically injure the entity, and how policy pro-
visions excluding coverage for property damage to insureds'
work and product are affected.92 Applying an accession theory
would be detrimental to ventures that depend on clear and un-
ambiguous language to determine the scope of coverage, and
would render meaningless all insurance industry attempts to
clarify policy language.
II. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING FROM
PROPERTY DAMAGE
Technically, the "property damage" definitions do not de-
termine the scope of liability coverage but serve only to define
the term as used elsewhere within the policies.93 Under the In-
suring Agreements' "damages because of ... property dam-
age" clause, however, the definition of "property damage" will
often delineate the scope of coverage for property damage lia-
bility. Damages compensating for "property damage" 94 are
89. Id. at 541.
90. Because diminution in value clearly constituted "property damage"
under the 1966 revisions, courts did not need to apply the accession theory. See
supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
91. See Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Coss, 80 Cal. App. 3d 890, 892-
93, 145 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 (1978) (rejecting application of accession theory under
1973 policy to defective materials incorporated into structure).
92. See Hauenstein v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354, 357, 65
N.W.2d 122, 125 (1954) ('The law of accession.., has no justifiable use as a
vehicle for importing ambiguity into the language of an insurance contract
where none otherwise exists."). A possible method of avoiding conflicts with
the exclusions from coverage of an insured's work or product would be to re-
quire that the insured show damages greater than the value of the insured's
work or product. Cf. Sturges Mfg. Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 69 332
N.E.2d 319, 321, 371 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1975) (diminution in value caused by incorpo-
ration of defective ski straps must exceed cost of the incorporated defective
item).
93. Tinker, supra note 8, at 219.
94. Numerous equations are used to measure the appropriate award for
"property damage." Traditional textbook measurements include cost of repair
for physically injured tangible property, reasonable rental cost of replacement
for lost use of tangible property, and amount of diminution in value for the cor-
responding injury to tangible property. Occasionally, when damages are diffi-
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"damages because of ... property damage" and, unless ne-
gated by other policy language,95 are covered. Likewise, most
losses not within the "property damage" definitions are not
"damages because of . . . property damage," and are outside
the scope of covered property damage liability. Many question,
however, whether the "damages because of... property dam-
age" clause covers those losses that would not have occurred
but for the '"property damage." To illustrate, when a business's
factory collapses, the business may consequently suffer great
loss of profits and damage to its business reputation and good-
will from failure to meet contracts requiring the factory's prod-
ucts. Although these consequential injuries are not themselves
'property damage,"9 6 these injuries might be covered by liabil-
ity policies because they arise from property damage to the fac-
tory. Coverage depends on the role given "property damage"
within the "damages because of... property damage" clause.
Insurers frequently contend that coverage under the "dam-
ages because of ... property damage" clause is limited by the
scope of the "property damage" definitions:9 7 only damages
compensating for injuries falling within the definitions 98 are
covered by the phrase. Because intangible losses are not
"property damage,"99 damages compensating for those losses
are not "damages because of ... property damage," even when
the intangible losses flowfrom property damage. This position
cult to compute or, because of special circumstances, prove inadequate
compensation when measured by traditional formulas, awards compensating
for the "property damage" may be measured by other, non-"property damage"
injuries. See, e.g., Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 47
Cal. Rptr. 564, 569, 407 P.2d 868, 873 (1965) (houses' diminution in value mea-
sured, in part, by overhead costs incurred during repair); Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Crider, 392 F. Supp. 162, 171-72 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (damages for physi-
cal injury to casings measured by lost profits). That the damages are measured
by a non-"property damage" loss, such as overhead costs and lost profits, is ir-
relevant when the damages directly compensate for the property damage, and
not for the non-"property damage" loss. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Crider, 392 F. Supp. 162, 172 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul
Mercury Indem. Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 564, 569, 407 P.2d 868, 873 (1965).
95. See, for example, the type of property damage discussed supra note 47.
96. See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
97. See, for example, the insurer's arguments in Yakima Cement Prods.
Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 22 Wash. App. 536, 546, 590 P.2d 371, 377 (1979) (con-
tending that overhead costs are not covered by the policy because they are not
"property damage"), rev'd, 608 P.2d 254 (1980); Central Armature Works v.
American Motorists Ins. Co., 520 F. Supp. 283, 289 (D.D.C. 1980) (contending
that lost profits are not covered); General Ins. Co. v. Gauger, 13 Wash. App. 928,
931-32, 538 P.2d 563, 566 (1975) (same).
98. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
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views the "property damage" definitions as the ultimate deter-
minant of the scope of coverage for property damage liability.
No case law directly supports this contention. In Geddes &
Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 100 however,
the California Supreme Court held that intangible losses are
never covered under policy language requiring damage to tan-
gible property. In Geddes, the insured supplied defective doors
which were installed in a number of houses. The court ruled
that the houses' diminished values constituted property dam-
age,' 0 ' but denied coverage for damages compensating for lost
profits and goodwill because the injuries were not to tangible
property. 0 2 The Geddes court did not discuss whether the lost
profits and goodwill resulted from the houses' diminished val-
ues because it found the presence of property damage to the
houses irrelevant to any coverage for lost profits and goodwill
damages: "Such damages are no less outside the coverage of
the policy because there was also damage to the houses."'10 3
Several other courts examining the 1966 CGLP have re-
jected the Geddes approach and viewed the "property damage"
definition' 0 4 as a starting point, rather than a stopping point, for
determining coverage. 0 5 These courts conclude that once
"property damage" is found, all losses stemming from that
damage are covered, including intangible losses. 0 6 Unfortu-
nately, the reasoning in these decisions is unpersuasive. A few
100. 51 Cal. 2d 558, 334 P.2d 881 (1959) (en banc).
101. Id. at 565, 334 P.2d at 885.
102. Id. at 565-66, 334 P.2d at 885-86.
103. Id. at 566, 334 P.2d at 886; see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Consolidated
Milk Prods. Ass'n, 354 F. Supp. 879 (D.N.H. 1973) (adopting the Geddes reason-
ig verbatim). In Liberty Mutual, the insured sold defective creamers to the
third-party claimant who resold them to food processing and serving establish-
ments. The court ruled that products in which the cream was used suffered
property damage. See id. at 882. The lost profits and goodwill allegedly suf-
fered by the third-party claimant were held to be outside the policy, with Ged-
des cited as authority. The Liberty Mutual court, like the Geddes court, did not
examine whether any causal connection existed between the property damage
to products using the cream and the lost profits and goodwill.
104. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
105. Courts have not yet confronted this coverage issue under the 1973 pol-
icy language.
106. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Time Corp., 704 F.2d 80
(2d Cir. 1983) (lost profits resulting from defective motors incorporated into
zone valves); Central Armature Works v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 520 F.
Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1980) (lost profits resulting from negligently repaired scrap
metal shredder); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gauger, 13 Wash. App. 928, 538 P.2d
563 (1980) (lost profits resulting from defective crop seed); Yakima Cement
Prods. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 22 Wash. App. 536, 590 P.2d 371 (1979) (in-
creased overhead cost resulting from defective concrete panels), rev'd on other
grounds, 93 Wash. 2d 210, 608 P.2d 254 (1980).
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courts treat their coverage holdings as well-settled law and con-
sequently fail to undertake a meaningful analysis of the policy
language. 07 The remaining courts rest their decisions on two
apparently interdependent grounds: (1) that the "property
damage" definition, "injury to or destruction of tangible prop-
erty," does not demand physical injury to tangible property;
and (2) that the term "damages" used in the phrase "damages
because of ... property damage" does not restrict coverage of
consequential damages.108
The first ground, that the "property damage" definition
does not require physical injury to tangible property, does not
support the conclusion that the definition covers damages re-
sulting from injuries to "obligations, rights and other in-
tangibles"109 when those injuries result from property damage.
Without exception, courts have recognized that injuries such as
increased overhead costs and lost profits, reputation, and good-
will do not involve tangible property and, standing alone, are
never "property damage."" 0 Nothing in the 1966 definition sug-
gests that an intangible loss magically transforms into an "in-
jury to ... tangible property" merely because it is
consequential to covered property damage. The 1966 definition,
"injury to or destruction of tangible property,""' no more sup-
ports coverage of these consequential intangible losses" 2 than
107. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Time Inc., 704 F.2d 80, 84 (2d
Cir. 1983) (stating that coverage of all direct and consequential damages is the
accepted general rule of New York); Central Armature Works v. American Mo-
torists Ins., 520 F. Supp. 283, 289 (D.D.C. 1980) (resolving coverage of conse-
quential damages through reliance on precedents); see also Thomas J. Lipton,
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 356, 357 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1974) (supports
coverage of lost profits without discussion).
108. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Munroe, 165 Mont. 185, 191-92, 527 P.2d 64, 68 (1974)
(lost profits resulting from ruined crop and other property damage caused by
defective crop seed); General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gauger, 13 Wash. App. 928, 538
P.2d 563 (1980) (lost profits resulting from ruined crop caused by defective crop
seed); Yakima Cement Prods. Co., 22 Wash. App. at 546, 590 P.2d at 377 (in-
creased overhead costs resulting from property damage caused by defective ce-
ment panels); see also United Properties Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 311 N.W.2d 689,
692 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981) (lost profits resulting from defective tennis court
coating).
109. Labberton v. General Casualty Co., 53 Wash. 2d 180, 186-87, 332 P.2d 250,
254 (1958).
110. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
112. This odd justification apparently stems from reasoning and language
used in early court decisions considering whether lost crop yield caused by de-
fective products is "property damage" under various CGLP forms. One of the
first cases to recognize that such a loss was property damage was Saint Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1966), which
held that diminution in a wheat field's productivity was synonymous with dimi-
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section (1) of the 1973 definition, requiring "physical injury to
or destruction of tangible property, 1 ' 3 negates it.
Somewhat more persuasive is the second justification,
which rests on the broad use of the word "damages" in the In-
suring Agreement clause, "damages because of ... property
damage." "Damages," in the 1966 policy, is defined as including
"loss of use of property resulting from property damage.""14
This definition is not restrictive, and does not exclude the pos-
sibility that consequential damages are included within the
scope of the "damages" definition.115 This justification is also
valid for the 1973 CGLP, where "damages" is undefined.116
This justification alone, however, is insufficient to support
coverage for all consequential losses that are not themselves
"property damage." Although the term "damages" does not ex-
clude such coverage, it does not stand independently in the
"damages because of ... property damage" clause. If the qual-
ifying phrase "because of... property damage" is interpreted
to restrict "damages" to those compensating for direct "Prop-
erty damage," intangible losses will never be covered. If, on the
other hand, the phrase is interpreted to include damages com-
pensating for all injuries resulting from property damage, dam-
ages for consequential losses stemming from "property
damage," including intangible losses, would be covered as
"damages because of... property damage."
nution in its value, see id. at 366. The court supported its finding by citing dimi-
nution in value cases that "squarely recognize [d] that consequential damages,
including the diminution in value of property, caused by the use or application
of a deficient or inferior product fall within the coverage provisions of an insur-
ing agreement." Id. at 366. If the insurer had wished to avoid such "conse-
quential damages" as diminution in value, the court indicated that it should
require "physical" injuries. Id. at 367 & n.6 (citing Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 281 F.2d 538, 539 n.1 (2d Cir. 1960), where insurer explic-
itly required "physical" injury).
Courts subsequently applying Northern Grain's reasoning have not recog-
nized that its use of the phrase "consequential damages" operated only to dis-
tinguish nonphysical injuries, such as diminution in value, from physical
injuries. Judicial confusion is evident in another crop yield case, Safeco Ins.
Co. v. Munroe, 165 Mont. 185, 192, 527 P.2d 64, 68 (1974), where the court based
its finding of coverage for consequential loss of profits on the absence of any
requirement of "tangible" damage to tangible property. See also Yakima Ce-
ment Prods. Co., 22 Wash. App. at 546, 590 P.2d at 377 (adopting the Safeco rea-
soning to conclude that "once there is injury to tangible property [the insured
is] entitled to recover all other damages flowing from that injury whether tangi-
ble or intangible").
113. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
114. See Gowan, supra note 21, at 285; supra note 50 and accompanying text.
115. Tinker, supra note 8, at 254.
116. See supra note 50.
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The validity of the alternative interpretations ultimately
rests on the meaning of "because of' in the clause. To reach
the interpretation limiting coverage to the scope of the "prop-
erty damage" definitions, "because of' must be read as
"equivalent to," "to the extent of," or "no more than."" 7 To
reach the second interpretation, which includes damages for all
injuries resulting from property damage, "because of' must
mean "on account of," "as a consequence of," or "arising
from."1 8 The latter interpretation is the "common, popular and
ordinary meaning"" 9 of "because of,"120 the meaning applied
by courts dealing with similar insurance policy language,121 and
therefore the meaning that should be applied here. Damages
for intangible losses such as increased overhead costs, lost
profits, reputation, and goodwill are covered when those intan-
gible losses result from covered "property damage." Because
such intangible losses result from "property damage," damages
compensating for the losses occurred "because of... property
damage."
This reading of the phrase "because of' limits coverage of
consequential intangible losses to situations where the insured
can show a causal connection linking the losses to covered
property damage and, concurrently, renders coverage highly
elastic, with its scope adjusting to the causal connection be-
tween the "property damage" and other injuries.122 This elas-
ticity could not have been unexpected by the insurance
117. Cf. Greenwood Cemetary, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 316,
232 S.E.2d 910, 913 (1977) (insurer's contention that "damages . . . for ...
mental anguish" does not include corresponding punitive damages interprets
"for" as meaning "'equivalent to' (and therefore not greater than) or 'to the
amount, value or extent of ").
118. Cf. id. (insured's contention that "damages ... for ... mental
anguish" includes corresponding punitive damages interprets "for" as meaning
"'by reason of' or 'because of, on account of."').
119. See J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 8, § 7384, at 71; supra note
58 and accompanying text.
120. See THIn NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 194 (1965) (definition of
"because of"); FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW "STANDARD" DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 248 (1962) (same).
121. Wymore v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 182 Neb. 763, 764, 157 N.W.2d 194, 195
(1968) (clause excluding bodily injuries to persons on premises "because of" a
business conducted there does not include injuries to independent contractor
fixing roof; "'[Blecause of' means 'by reason of: on account of."'); see Globe
Indem. Co. v. People, 43 Cal. App. 3d 745, 750-51, 118 Cal. Rptr. 75, 79 (1974)
(damages compensating state for fire suppression costs are damages "because
of" property damage); Saucier's Case, 122 Me. 325, 330-31, 119 A. 860, 862 (1923)
("because [of employment]" in the Workmen's Compensation Act means "by
reason of; on account of" employment).
122. See Globe Indem. Co. v. People, 43 Cal. App. 3d 745, 756, 118 Cal. Rptr.
75, 83 (1974) (Brown, J., dissenting) ("The majority in substance has made the
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industry when it adopted the 1966 and 1973 policies. Similar
controversies had previously arisen over coverage of punitive
damages resulting from bodily injury or property damage, 23
and over consequential damages resulting from bodily in-
jury,124 with the decisions predominantly favoring insureds.
A difficulty bound to plague insurers and insureds is deter-
mining whether the required causal connection exists. Be-
cause liability insurance policy language is rarely, if ever,
invoked in liability suits, which determine damages,125 specific
proofs linking defined "property damage" to intangible losses
may not be available. An insurer would be well advised, when
defending a suit, to request submission of specific questions on
causal connection to the fact-finder to aid the insurer's cover-
age decision and bolster its position should the insured chal-
lenge that decision. In cases submitted without such specific
proofs, courts should take care not to imply causal connections
when common sense dictates otherwise.
Yakima Cement Products Co. v. Great American Insurance
Co. ' 26 presents a classic example of improper implication of a
coverage under the policy coextensive with the amount of damages the insured
may be liable for 'because of' the negligently caused fire.").
123. Prior to 1962, courts were virtually unanimous in holding that the
CGLP Insuring Agreements embraced punitive as well as compensatory dam-
ages. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Thronton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); General Casualty Co. of Am. v. Woodby,
238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D.
16 (S.D. Cal. 1943). But see Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 17,
39 P.2d 776, 779 (1934). Although no argument exists as to the coverage of puni-
tive damages under the 1966 and 1973 Insuring Agreements, see Morrison, In-
suring Punitive Damages, BEST'S INS. REV. (PROPERTY-CASUALTY), Jan. 1982, at
28, an increasing number of courts are holding that insuring punitive damages
violates public policy, following the seminal case of Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co.
v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1962), see Kendrigan, Public Policy's Prohibi-
tion against Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages, 36 INs. CouNs. J. 622,
622-25 (1969). As of January 1982, 21 jurisdictions held that punitive damages
were insurable, while 16 jurisdictions found them to be uninsurable on grounds
of public policy. Morisson, supra, at 30.
124. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez Rivera, 358 F.2d 480,
484 (1st Cir. 1966) (damages for children's mental pain and suffering covered as
consequential damages of father's bodily injury); Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty
Co. v. Yeroyan, 90 N.H. 145, 146, 5 A.2d 726, 727 (1939) (damages covered for hus-
band's loss of consortium resulting from wife's injuries). Although at one time
insurers customarily denied such consequential coverage, the present trend is
just the reverse: "If any insurer operating today sought to exclude such cover-
age, it would find no support from the courts and, in all likelihood, would be
ousted by the insurance commissioners from doing business in their states."
8A J. APPLEmAN & J. APPLEmAN, supra note 8, § 4893, at 59.
125. Foster, Humpty Dumpty, 28 INS. CouNs. J. 130, 131 (1961).
126. 22 Wash. App. 536, 590 P.2d 371 (1979), rev'd, 93 Wash. 2d 210, 608 P.2d
254 (1980).
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causal connection. In Yakima, an insured supplied cement
panels to a contractor for incorporation into two structures. Af-
ter installation, the panels were discovered to be defective. Al-
though the contractor took immediate steps to repair the
panels, construction was delayed and exposed roof materials
rusted. The Washington appellate court found that the struc-
tures' diminished values resulting from both the panels' incor-
poration and the rusted roof materials were "injury to or
destruction of tangible property."127 The court then deter-
mined that overhead costs from the delayed construction were
covered as consequential to the rusted roof materials:
Having found injury to tangible property in the form of physical
damage to the roof, Great American's contention that consequential
damages are not covered by the policy must fail .... [Olnce there is
injury to tangible property, Yakima was entitled to recover all other
damages naturally flowing from that injury whether tangible or intangi-
ble.... Therefore, the sum, .. . representing consequential damages,
is also recoverable by the insured.12 8
The court's fact statement indicates that most, if not all, of the
overhead costs were traceable to repair of the defective panels,
and were completely unrelated to the rusted roof materials.
Conceivably, the consequential damages were still covered as
stemming from the panels' diminished value. The court's deci-
sion, however, completely ignores this possibility, clinging to a
fictitious causal connection to justify coverage.
Reliance on such a causal connection is clearly improper,
as the only coverage of consequential intangible losses justified
by the 1966 and 1973 CGLPs is that provided in the policies' lan-
guage. The relatively simple language requiring damages to be
"because of" property damage requires consequential damages
to be causally related to the property damage. If courts ignore
this requirement, as did the Yakima court, the incentive to in-
surers to couch policies in clear, understandable language will
be severely reduced. Such a result would be harmful to ven-
tures that depend on definite and certain coverage language to
realize the full benefits of liability insurance.
CONCLUSION
This Note concludes that physical injury to tangible prop-
erty is included under the 1966 '"property damage" definition by
necessary implication and under the 1973 definition by specific
language. Lost use of tangible property satisfies the 1966 "in-
127. 22 Wash. App. at 544-45, 590 P.2d at 376.
128. 22 Wash. App. at 546, 590 P.2d at 377 (citations omitted).
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jury to" tangible property definition because loss of use is an
"injury" under the meaning of the "property damage" defini-
tion, and diminution in value of tangible property is likewise an
"injury" included under the 1966 definition. Although lost use
of tangible property continues to be covered under the 1973
'"property damage" definition, diminution in value of tangible
property does not. This Note cautions courts -against adopting
novel theories of "physical injury" to find coverage for injuries
normally characterized as diminution in value of tangible prop-
erty. It further argues that damages for intangible losses are
covered as "damages because of . . . property damage" when
those losses stem from covered property damage. Care should
be taken to avoid implying improper causal connections be-
tween the property damage and the intangible losses.
Laurie Vasichek
